BMME303
Accounting, Analysis and Governance in Complex Deals
Understand how (financial) information creates and solves conflicts between business leaders, oversight bodies, and other stakeholders throughout transactions.
Critically assess complex multi-type and multi-source information in transaction-related valuations and decisions.
M&A transactions typically are paid with cash, equity, debt, or some combination, with financing sources ranging from cash on hand to commercial banks to seller financing. Highly leveraged transactions (LBOs), often are structured by financial sponsors such as private equity firms, hedge funds, and venture capitalists.
DePamphilis (2025) Financing the Deal
How to Pay for a Share Deal?
Notes
Form of payment refers to the type of compensation given target shareholders and may include cash, debt, stock, or some combination of all three.
The form of transaction refers to what is being purchased (e.g., assets or shares) and how ownership is transferred.
The form of payment and the form of transaction are essential elements of deal structuring: choices made in one area affect other areas.
Why are payment and financing key to deal structuring?
\(\Rightarrow\) understand implications from different structures
Stock
Acquirer issues new shares
Share Exchange Ratio: (SER) number of shares the acquirer issues for each share of the target
SER = Offer Price Per (Target) Share / Acquirer Share Price = OPPS/ASP
New shares issued (target shares outstanding \(\times\) SER) are allocated to the target company’s shareholders
Total number of outstanding shares increases, so pre-acquisition shareholders own a smaller percentage of the acquirer
Example
Acquirer A agrees with shareholders of target B on a stock-paid acquisition of 100% of the shares of B by A. A offers to exchange (for each share of B) USD 47 worth of A’s stock whose market value is USD 108. Assume that A has 500 outstanding shares and B has 324.
Share Exchange Ratio & Implications for Shareholders?
Example
Share Exchange Ratio = Offer Price Per (Target) Share / Acquirer Share Price = OPPS/ASP \(= 47/108 = .4352\)
For every share of the target B that a shareholder of B owns, she would receive 0.4352 shares of the acquirer A
New shares issued = pre-acquisition target shares outstanding \(\times\) SER = \(324 \times .4352 \approx 141\)
Total number of post-acquisition shares of A: \(500 + 141 = 641\)
A’s pre-acquisition shareholders’ post-acquisition ownership: \(500/641 \approx 78\%\)
Exercise
Acquirer A agrees with shareholders of target B on a stock-paid acquisition of 100% of the shares of B by A. A offers to exchange (for each share of B) USD 62 worth of A’s stock whose market value is USD 95. Assume that A has 330 outstanding shares and B has 480.
Share Exchange Ratio & Implications for Shareholders?
→ Menti
Notes
SER = OPPS/ASP \(= 62/95 = .6526\)
For every share of the target B that a shareholder of B owns, she would receive 0.6526 shares of the acquirer A
New shares issued = pre-acquisition target shares outstanding \(\times\) SER = \(480 \times .6526 \approx 313\)
Total number of post-acquisition shares of A: \(330 + 313 = 643\)
A’s pre-acquisition shareholders’ post-acquisition ownership: \(330/643 \approx 51\%\)
Case
Assume that the acquirer and the target have a market capitalization of USD 1 billion (USD 10 \(\times\) 100m shares) and USD 500 million (USD 5 \(\times\) 100m shares), respectively. The acquirer pays a total price of USD 650 million, including a premium of 30 percent. […]
a) SER & Ownership Ratio if payment was in stock?
| Value (USD million) | |
|---|---|
| Acquirer (USD 10 \(\times\) 100m shares) | 1,000 |
| Target (USD 5 \(\times\) 100m shares) | 500 |
| Price Paid (30% premium) | 650 |
| Ownership Ratio (Stock Payment) | 39.4% / 60.6% |
SER = OPPS/ASP \(= 6.5/10 = .65\)
Total number of post-acquisition shares: \(100m + 65m = 165m\)
Ownership share of target shareholders \(65/165 \approx 39.4\%\)
Case cont’d
Assume 2 scenarios: “(1) a downside scenario in which the value of operating improvements is USD 50 million lower than the premium paid, and (2) an upside scenario in which the value of these improvements is USD 50 million higher than the premium. […]”
b. What if payment was in cash?
When is acquirer value created/destroyed?
Who does not bear the risk of value destruction?
| Downside Scenario (Synergies = 100) |
Upside Scenario (Synergies = 200) |
|
|---|---|---|
| Combined Value | 1,600 | 1,700 |
| Price Paid | (650) | (650) |
| Value of Acquirer Postdeal | 950 | 1,050 |
| Value of Acquirer Predeal | (1,000) | (1,000) |
| Acquirer Value Created (Destroyed) | (50) | 50 |
| Target Value Created (Destroyed) | 150 | 150 |
Value Creation/Destruction
Target shareholders receive guaranteed USD 650 million regardless of post-deal performance: shielded from implementation risk
Acquirer shareholders bear entire transaction risk, with stake value changing USD 50 million up/down based on acquisition outcomes
Cash payment creates asymmetric risk distribution: target shareholders get certainty while acquirer shareholders assume full responsibility for success/failure
c. What if payment was in stock?
Notes in Koller, Goedhart, and Wessels (2025)
“If the payment is entirely in cash, the target’s shareholders get USD 650 million, regardless of whether the improvements are high enough to justify the premium. These shareholders do not share in the implementation risk. The acquirer’s shareholders see the value of their stake increase by USD 50 million in the upside case and decrease by the same amount in the downside case. They carry the full risk.”
| Downside Scenario (Synergies = 100) |
Upside Scenario (Synergies = 200) |
|
|---|---|---|
| Combined Value | 1,600 | 1,700 |
| Target’s Share (39.4%) | (630) | (670) |
| Value of Acquirer Postdeal | 970 | 1,030 |
| Value of Acquirer Predeal | (1,000) | (1,000) |
| Acquirer Value Created (Destroyed) | (30) | 30 |
| Target Value Created (Destroyed) | 130 | 170 |
Value Creation/Destruction
Target shareholders participate in implementation, receiving USD 670m in upside scenarios vs USD 650m cash payment
Acquirer shareholders gain downside protection as target shareholders absorb part of poor outcomes (USD 630m vs USD 650m cash)
Stock payment creates risk-sharing alignment while target shareholders still receive premium over pre-deal value
Notes in Koller, Goedhart, and Wessels (2025)
“Next, consider the same transaction paid for in shares. The target’s shareholders participate in the implementation risk by virtue of being shareholders in the new combined entity. In the upside case, their payout from the acquisition increases as improvements increase: they receive USD 670 million in value, as opposed to USD 650 million. Effectively, even more value has been transferred from the acquirer’s shareholders to the target’s shareholders. The acquirer’s shareholders are willing to allow this form of payment, however, because they are protected if implementation goes poorly. If the deal destroys value, the target’s shareholders now get less than before, but still a nice premium, since their portion of the combined company is worth USD 630 million, compared with the USD 500 million market value before the deal.”
“Assuming that the acquirer is not capital constrained, the real issue is whether the risks and rewards of the deal should be shared with the target’s shareholders.”
Koller, Goedhart, and Wessels (2025) (Ch. 31)
\(\Rightarrow\) let’s apply these insights to the GameStop-eBay case
\(\rightarrow\) The case brings together the three issues we just discussed: cash vs. stock, risk sharing, and ownership dilution.
The stock portion of the offer gives each eBay share a stock value of USD 62.50. The implied SER is:
\[ SER = \frac{OPPS_{\text{stock}}}{ASP} = \frac{62.50}{25} = 2.50 \]
Each eBay share would be exchanged for 2.50 GameStop shares under the stock leg. New shares issued to eBay shareholders:
\[ N = 445\text{m} \times 2.50 = 1{,}112.5\text{m} \]
Interim takeaway \(\rightarrow\) under a fixed-value stock leg, a low bidder share price mechanically implies a high SER and therefore substantial share issuance
Total post-deal shares equal legacy GameStop shares plus newly issued shares:
\[ Shares_{post} = Shares_{GME,pre} + N = 445 + 1{,}112.5 = 1{,}557.5\text{m} \]
Ownership shares after the transaction would therefore be:
\[ Ownership_{\, \text{Legacy eBay}} = \frac{1{,}112.5}{1{,}557.5} \approx 71.43\% \]
\[ Ownership_{\, \text{Legacy GME}} = \frac{445}{1{,}557.5} \approx 28.57\% \]
EPS dilution occurs when a stock-paid acquisition reduces the acquirer’s earnings per share
How?
\(\rightarrow\) EPS diluted if earnings contribution from target does not proportionally offset share increase
Example
100 shares outstanding
Shares trade at 66
Net income: 330
P/E = 20
EPS = 3.3
100 shares outstanding
OPPS: 100
Net income: 330
P/E = 30
EPS = 3.3
Example cont’d
\[ SER = OPPS/ASP = 100/66 \approx 1.515 \]
New Shares Issued = 100 \(\times\) 1.515 = 151.5
Total Shares Post-Acquisition = 100 + 151.5 = 251.5
EPS Combined: (330 + 330) / 251.5
\(\Rightarrow\) EPS diluted from 3.3 to 2.624
\(\Rightarrow\) Dilution occurs because the target’s P/E is higher than the acquirer’s P/E
Example Alternative
Assume: change OPPS from 100 to 39.6
P/E of target = 39.6 / 3.3 = 12
EPS target = 3.3
New Shares Issued = 100 \(\times\) (39.6/66) = 60
Total Shares Post-Acquisition = 100 + 60 = 160
EPS Combined: (330 + 330) / 160 = 4.125
\(\Rightarrow\) EPS accretive from 3.3 to 4.125
\(\Rightarrow\) Accretion occurs because the target’s P/E is lower than the acquirer’s P/E
Buyer’s preference for payment depends on borrowing capacity, concerns about short-term EPS dilution, how attractive its stock is, and willingness to take on risk
Seller’s preference is shaped by the buyer’s stock appeal, need for cash, desire for tax advantages, risk appetite, belief in future upside, wish to retain ownership, and interest in valuable licenses or patents
One party cannot force their preference on the other: agreement needed!
\(\rightarrow\) if agreed on stock payment, how to deal with market fluctuations?
Payment in Stock
Stock Payment: Fluctuations
Subsequent fluctuations in the acquirer’s stock price can pose a threat of termination before closing, which is why parties implement collars around fixed share exchange or fixed-value agreements to share the risk or benefit from market fluctuations.
Why threat? How to share this risk?
See DePamphilis (2025) Chapter 11
Threat from Market Fluctuations?
Common Arrangements at Signing
Fixed Share Exchange: precludes any changes in the number of acquirer shares exchanged for each target share (fix SER)
Fixed Value Exchange: fixes the value of the offer price per share by allowing the share-exchange ratio to vary (fix OPPS)
Situation at Closing
→ fixed share exchange/value exchange agreed at signing can be affected by market developments until closing
Example: Fixed Share Exchange
Use market values at signing to determine fixed SER (e.g., 100/200); consider appreciation/depreciation of acquirer’s market value
Acquirer: its share price appreciates (to 250) → makes acquisition economically more costly (USD 125)
Seller: acquirer’s share price drops (to 150) → lower-than-expected remuneration (USD 75)
Solution
Fixed Share and Fixed Value Exchange leave significant uncertainty about the final value of the acquisition
Collar Arrangements allow offer price per share (in a fixed share exchange agreement) and/or share exchange ratio (in a fixed value agreement) to vary within (narrow) limits
→ from point estimate to range
\[ OPPS = SER \times ASP \]
with collar: \[ SER_L \times ASP_L \leq OPPS \leq SER_U \times ASP_U \]
where
L/U Lower/Upper Limit
OPPS Offer Price per Share
SER Share Exchange Ratio
ASP Acquirer’s Share Price
Example
A target agrees to a USD 50 purchase price based on a share exchange ratio of 1.25 acquirer shares for each target share. The value of the acquirer share at the time of the agreement is USD 40 per share. Target shareholders are guaranteed to receive USD 50 per share as long as the acquirer’s share price stays within a range of USD 35 to USD 45 per share. The share exchange ratio floats within the USD 35 to USD 45 range in order to maintain the USD 50 purchase price.
- Fixed Value or Fixed Share Exchange?
- What’s the collar range of the share exchange ratio?
Example
\[ \begin{aligned} SER_L \times ASP_L \leq OPPS \leq SER_U \times ASP_U \\ \\ (50/35) \times 35 \leq (50/40) \times 40 \leq (50/45) \times 45 \\ \\ 1.4286 \times 35 \leq 1.25 \times 40 \leq 1.1111 \times 45 \\ \\ \end{aligned} \]
Fixed Value: purchase price is fixed by allowing the share exchange rate to vary
Gives seller some certainty inside a narrow range within which the acquirer share price floats
Facts
On 9/5/2009, Flextronics agreed to acquire IDW with stock payment and an aggregate value of approximately USD 300 million. The share exchange ratio used at closing was calculated using the Flextronics average daily closing share price for the 20 trading days ending on the fifth trading day immediately preceding the closing.
SER generally calculated based on the 10 to 20 trading day period ending 5 days prior to closing. The 5-day period provides time to calculate the appropriate acquirer share price and to incorporate into legal documents.
Transaction terms identified the following three collars:
In which range does the exchange ratio float?
SER Float \[ SER_L \times ASP_L \leq OPPS \leq SER_U \times ASP_U \] \[ (6.55/10.55) \times 10.55 \leq (6.55/11.73) \times 11.73 \leq (6.55/12.90) \times 12.90 \]
\[ .6209 \times 10.55 \leq .5584 \times 11.73 \leq .5078 \times 12.90 \]
# Define the parameters
min_price <- 10.55
mid_price <- 11.73
max_price <- 12.90
offer_price <- 6.55
# Generate a sequence of acquirer share prices within the collar range
price_seq <- seq(from = min_price, to = max_price, length.out = 100)
# Compute the exchange ratio for each acquirer share price
df <- data.frame(
acquirer_price = price_seq,
exchange_ratio = offer_price / price_seq
)Transaction terms identified the following three collars:
Fixed Value Agreement for +/- 10% ASP fluctuation (see before)
Fixed Share Exchange for [11;15]% ASP fluctuation (…)
Transaction terms identified the following three collars:
Fixed Share Exchange for [11;15]% ASP fluctuation +
Above 15% increase in ASP: OPPS capped at USD 6.85
“Free fall” of ASP: IDW may terminate
mid_price <- 11.73
offer_price_base <- 6.55 # fixed exchange ratio base offer price
offer_price_cap <- 6.85 # capped offer price above upper threshold
#
# Calculate collar thresholds
lower_threshold <- mid_price * (1 - 0.15)
lower_mid_threshold <- mid_price * (1 - 0.10)
upper_mid_threshold <- mid_price * (1 + 0.10)
upper_threshold <- mid_price * (1 + 0.15)
#
# Generate a sequence of acquirer share prices from just below lower to above upper
# Calculate range as percentages around mid_price
min_percent <- -0.20 # 20% below mid_price
max_percent <- 0.20 # 20% above mid_price
#
# Generate sequence based on percentage changes from mid_price
aps_seq <- seq(
from = mid_price * (1 + min_percent),
to = mid_price * (1 + max_percent),
length.out = 200
)
#
# Compute offer price per share for each APS
offer_price <- sapply(aps_seq, function(price) {
if (price < lower_threshold) {
return(0) # agreement can be terminated
} else if (price >= lower_mid_threshold && price <= upper_mid_threshold) {
return(offer_price_base) # fixed exchange ratio base offer price
} else if (price > upper_mid_threshold && price <= upper_threshold) {
return(offer_price_base/upper_mid_threshold * price) # floating offer price with fixed exchange ratio
} else if (price >= lower_threshold && price < lower_mid_threshold) {
return(offer_price_base/lower_mid_threshold * price)
} else if (price > upper_threshold) {
return(offer_price_cap) # capped offer price
} else {
return(NA) # capped purchase price
}
})
#
df <- data.frame(
APS = aps_seq,
OfferPrice = offer_price
)“We find that bidders in stock mergers originate substantially more news stories after the start of merger negotiations, but before the public announcement. This strategy generates a short-lived run-up in bidders’ stock prices during the period when the stock exchange ratio is determined, which substantially impacts the takeover price.”
Ahern and Sosyura (2014)
Titlepage photo by Dennis Möller on Unsplash